

9/11 Commission files

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Mineta Interview

Scanned by Mike Williams of 911myths.com on 24th March 2009

Minuta Interview

Assessment of aviation sec system at outbreak of terror

- M: Prior to conf hearings, most material dealt w/ capacity of trans system; principal role of dept is safety. Safety of various modes.
Security is aviation IC resp of airlines
C airports - to protect FAA oversight K.
our role one of oversight and monitoring rather than direct involvement.

Most emphasis on capacity constraints -
congestion. Things of that nature. Not
security

CI- Sum up

- M: Summer of 2000 - referred to as "Summer
hell" b/c high # delays. Saw with the
high degree of industry dissatisfaction.
Focus was trying to avert that in Summer of 01

C: Role of oversight & monitoring - did any
specific issues come to your attention?

JF: Have to go ✓ records

don't recall - monitoring is removed

b/c civil sec office of FAA was really dead with
OST one step removed from direct involvement.

CK: July 17 - FAA published a rule
Revol statement of threat - how y aware?

Rule itself yes, but again there are
a lot of statements that are general in
nature - prognosis about what going in
future. As a general statement safety/sec
resp of FAA / DOT.

I think that come as result of Ito
review on airplane security

SB: my recollection rule was to make
changes to FAR - sure, Ito reports
and others that were pt of changes.

CK: In summer a lot of intel chatter &
wargames - your knowledge of ad briefings
on.

M: I do get intel briefings - done by
CIA people who ... changed from before.

Essentially I get a daily briefing on
intel matters - I had a high

infant b/c background, other ad service on
H.P.S.E. I consider a big asp. of power.
The kind of info was a lot of clutter, but
in terms of credibility on even the credibility
of source. But there was a great deal of
increased clutter. Post 9/11 to the extent
that the whole agency had gone back

9/11 Closed by Statute

was CA person on 9/11

today 9/11 Closed by Statute

in office of intel & security

CK: did anyone pay to you attention
when b/f statements of sub?

M: NO

CK: reading statements

all
Questions from Sam:

① system designed to stop cars & cargo
② he thought had by now

Report of KAA - reference: by Jankys
Worldwide

M: Philosophy about hijacking was... generally
think, hijacking as they occur overseas.
even if they did occur in domestic
approach was to cooperate. get the plane on
ground, and let law enforcement deal with

Wasn't one of Thursday on fighting hijackers —
how to best control engine hijack once to
get plane a goal.

Day of

① Notifications protocol

How followed on 9/11?
Who made calls when occur?

In any major incident, the basic issue is
info gathering, and our ground poc, is Sec of Cab
attending. What did you do notify.

JK: We were in process of such — Sec of CA
called us, I told Al Weather we already
decided to send her to WH
also in protocol we would contact C
Attlee.
by the time that occur we thought that
know as much as we.

m No protocol / notifications —
today my resp. would not be to pick
up phone and call Al. ad?

did we speak to Eberhart

requested by Cab Attlee to go

OK M: No stuff

Hard taken about statement we have
some planes - maybe a ~~few~~ week later.

No sense AA CEO had any awareness of
comms from cockpit. I had called Cathy &
Goodman to ask if uncrewed from planes,
in another call I called and said couldn't
account for planes.

OK: arrival Quest —

M

Got to WH about 9:20
Spoke to dual Cast very
short, I think he talked to me
for about 3 minutes. SS Agent took
him to PEOC.

~~State~~ SUTS not underway
M not aware of SUTS

Logs from WH

has sense that is was significant
earlier. ~~we were~~

you heard of Post Clash at PEOC.

VP was already @ PEOC: he and C. M. V.

was there - as well as Karl Tawcett.

CK: 2 lines of common questions - what info received

M: CONVO back and forth with John & John
~~the~~ across from VP
Mrs C @ end of table -
at every seat phone

phone w/ John & phone w/ Monk

Monitors for news programs were about
me. Most of who came in was from
CONVO w/ Monk. Trying to deal w/ issue of
unaccounted a/c - no that came later.
I related this convo of yours me coming in
DRA - I'd say to
Monk what do you have a place -
where we have is a target - no
Manspader - I asked came you what
position of a/c w/ grad.

AA93 - I'm sorry AA77.

Someone broke into CONVO and said we had a
call from that county police officer who said AA
info Perkins.

Clearly to best of your recollection it was plan that left
Washington - yes.

Report plane down on OH/KY border - Plane
he later came

Spoke to
Belgar-
~~Spoke~~

→ Talk to Belgar about what he was doing.
his army what Belgar was doing
was 77.

Circle
back w/ Flaherty. re AATF Assumptions.

m: What was coming up VP - had no knowledge.
My time was one place w/ John & Monte.

CX: DOT participated in SUTS? - later one SUTS.

m: NO common b/f SUTS and ~~AE~~

interagency SUTS.

→ Gene Norris - w/ Flaherty - went over to FAA
around noon, to participate in SUTS.

Ground civil aviation - 9:50 - 10:00:

m: After plane went into Pensacola - 2

said to Monk we ought to bring plan down
into said or per pilot discretion. But I
didn't want pilot over us. Hooky. ... Screw
pilot discretion. Bring all the plans down.

Three of same thing - that's a program, place.
We still had all these unaccounted for 41st
many 7-10 planes. Ground hold on plans into
N.Y. Region.

→ Ground 3 of something happening under a plane -
after Pentagon and b/f Shenandoah.

M: (the decisions from PEDC)
was in cocoons of my own belly to
John or Monk.

→ only other convo I had was on
actions of Coast 6. & seeing bridges.

CK: Shoot down
happened pretty much right after I go to
is there.

down comes in from equip/comm room.
~~the~~ fully preoccupied w/ our convo.

CK: FAA/N Comm?

M: Monte mentioned something about contact w/ OAS
ABB, don't know where - same reference?

CK: Re Scramble?

That was early one, it was in early
w/ plane guy down river - where young
man came in and said plane 10 miles out.
said order ~~and~~ still stood? yes. I didn't
really think about it. But "I wonder
what that was all about" I ~~remember~~ I
had also heard about Scramble etc.

* Someone in room said Thompson still 7-9
miles away, coming up from Norfolk area.

I wonder if order given to shoot down as
civil etc.

23 → No one in PEOC had knowledge/awareness
of plane

I said Dick did we shoot it down?
He said, shut w/ down. See if that
was our day?

... Wasn't until 12:30 - until Dick got back

I don't know if people want to start doing

m: We had issued Noham, end of Sept. ops - seeing obvious
b/c could have military at one point.

CK: turn to guns?

Box culture
No guns

FAA

no inexperience of inquis as they have plans.

* Statement - Reference to Noham

JF: "We" means DOT / FAA

m: yab, that's the FAA.

Aftermath of 9/11

Was there any after actions review with respect to day?

m: Not a formal sit down after review led of
sessions. It started on 9/11 w/ Perez asking me
how can we get all back up. At some

Thought by most deep. But at intel briefing with
morning - I decided no plans up on 12th.

Then on Thurs we allowed ~~pt~~ airlines to position
a/c.

CK: Consider for resumption?

M: whole issue was security of airports & airports
By Sat on Sun had put together rapid response
teams

CK: decision to resume civil aviation, well it goes?

We had to clear w/ NSC. JS objected a lot.
National Airport not allowed to open for a couple of
weeks.

CK: DOT clear comm on system for 9/11?

We have Sep Gold medal award - for 01 gave it
to NACTA. for the work for bus a/c down
safely.

4500 a/c brought down in 2 hrs
14 mins.

9/11 medal and ribbon - Plox awarded.

CK: Flight 77 disappears -

Pt of whole modernization & transition from old hard radar to GPS - the decision had been made to go to new system.

In terms of primary radar, I think there were only one or two but local short range - vast array still operating - pt of long term modernization.

CK: Air Traffic Control Change post 9/11

Skills of ATC, in terms of increased training. Skills have been honed. We have a system now of alt being tracked. When plane deviates from flight plane, able to pull up that deviation, need more report capability from ATC. I'm not that specific in terms of my knowledge of what's been done. We have done things to be more alert not just about comm aviation but general aviation - things like My 5 page. GFA community constituted about security etc.

no way of securing alt - not like a car w/ an ignition key.

Creation of TSA

Ch: ① Role in drafting of legislation

M: We did that (concept of TSA) very early on -
WH had asked for a policy paper from us. So we
submitted one, essentially in consultation w/ DOT
and Treasury, ie who would be resp for new agency.
By the end early Oct we had submitted the
papers - then decision made would be given to
DOT for setting up new agency.

difference oprio Cag 1e WH one box set up:
We thought work of TSA would be to set up
rules and monitor screening on all modes/
would be done by Contractors

Recommendations

data future: into study

We still work at day to day: has to continue,
more so in future; Q is how to fix all
mess up all that into so it's manageable. If aviation
is going to be the principal way of terror
attack - which I don't think is really the case.
~~As of~~ Mantra still big Q.

Ref to ^{kept} flights coming in - how to get
more

manifest, that's TSA but we have an
interest in it b/c we're working w/ state & other
carriers and other nations.

CK: TTIC - is it only your req?

m The Issue is it forward looking and to be
specific and to take some kind of action.

Is there a way to connect all the dots?

I don't think we've gotten to that yet.
Terrorists only have to get it at
one, we have to transform. Very high bar

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DRAFT

MINETA INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TEAM 8 OUTLINE

Themes & Objectives:

FAA/NORAD Relationship pre 9/11 and communications on 9/11
Substance, source and flow of information in PEOC on 9/11
Details of the shoot down order
Clarify record from May regarding key times and events

QUESTIONS CLARIFYING OR RELATING TO SECRETARY MINETA'S MAY TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION

(1) Notification protocols on 9/11: In testimony last May before the Commission you stated:

“In an incident involving a major crash of any type, the Office of the Secretary goes into a major information-gathering response. It contacts the mode of administration overseeing whatever mode of transportation is involved in the incident. It monitors press reports, contacts additional personnel to accommodate the surge in operations, and centralizes the information for me through the chief of staff. In major incidents, it will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies involved in the incident.”

Central to the Commission's work in evaluating the air defense response on 9/11 is an understanding of the notifications DOT and FAA made on 9/11, and in particular the information that was conveyed to DoD and NORAD.

- a. Please describe the “protocol of notification” that was in effect on 9/11. How was it followed that day? Specifically, what notifications did FAA or DOT make to the White House, the Defense Department and NORAD?
- b. In your May testimony you referenced the activation of DOT's Crisis Management Center on 9/11. In an air event emergency how does this crisis operations center interact with the FAA Operations Center. Who takes the lead/responsibility for notifying other agencies (i.e., White House, DoD)?

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(2) **Early Information\Notification to the White House:** Last May you testified that your chief of staff, Mr. Flaherty, first notified you that the FAA had received an “unconfirmed report” that a hijacking of an American Airlines flight had occurred.

a. Were you informed that the FAA air traffic controllers – at approximately 0825 -- had actually overheard Arab voices in the cockpit of American flight 11 saying “we have some planes?” Did you learn of this statement at any point during the day? To your knowledge, based upon your conversation with Mr. Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, was the leadership of American aware of this statement?

d. Regarding your early contacts with the White House, who did your office contact at the White House to inform them of the hijacking? Who from the White House called your chief of staff and requested that you operate from the White House? Did anyone from your staff go with you to the PEOC?

(3) **Time Secretary Mineta entered PEOC:** One of our challenges is to try and create an accurate timeline of the events that occurred on 9/11. To that end, let me revisit with you some of the times from your earlier testimony.

You estimated that you arrived at the PEOC at approximately 9:20 am. In terms of your arrival, you also stated that once at the White House, you first went to the Situation Room and spoke to Dick Clarke, and then went down to the PEOC.

a. The logs that have been made available to us from the White House indicate that you entered the PEOC at XX. Does that time seem plausible to you?

[A couple of data points to use as reference: the second plane (Flight 175) hit the South Tower at 9:03; the Pentagon was hit at 09:38; records indicated that the Vice President did not arrive in the PEOC until approximately 09:40]

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(4) **Communications to\from PEOC:** Once inside the PEOC, you testified that you established two lines of communication: one with your chief of staff and a second with Monty Belger & Jane Garvey, both of whom were in the FAA operations Center.

a. What information were you receiving from them? What did you do with it? To your knowledge, was the PEOC receiving information from other sources regarding the status of hijacked aircraft, or were you (through your staff) the only source of this information? If there were other sources, what were they?

b. It is my understanding that Dick Clarke was chairing an interagency Secure Video Conference (SVTS) from the Situation Room, and the DOT and perhaps the FAA were participating in that.

Were you aware of the SVTS, and if so, who from DOT was participating in it? From the FAA? Was it already underway when you arrived at the Situation Room? Once you relocated to the PEOC, were you and/or the Vice President connected to the SVTS? How was information from the FAA regarding hijacked aircraft being coordinated between the PEOC and Situation Room?

c. The Vice President and others have discussed in the media that on the morning of 9/11 the PEOC was receiving false reports of aircraft that were supposedly inbound to Washington. I understand that this happened repeatedly – a duty officer or staffer would announce an inbound aircraft so many miles or minutes out and everyone would wait for a possible hit on the White House that never occurred.

Do you recall any such reports? Was the FAA the source of this information? If so, what were they seeing? To your knowledge, post-9/11, was there any effort to track down the source of these false reports?

(5) **Communications with NORAD:** With respect to NORAD, last May May you testified “Within a few minutes, AA 77 crashed into the Pentagon. At this time, as we discussed the situation with the North American Aerospace Defense commander and his staff, we considered implementing an emergency system of coordinated air traffic management to allow maximum use of defensive activities.”

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DRAFT

a. Did you speak directly with the NORAD commander (General Eberhart)? If so, please tell us the substance of these communications. In terms of time, did this conversation occur within a few minutes of the crash of AA77. Who is "we" in this statement?

b. Prior to 9/11, were you familiar with NORAD? Please describe your relationship (if any).

c. Looking back on the situation now, it is apparent that an effective air defense operation on 9/11 required close communications between the FAA and NORAD. Was that clear to you at the time? What steps did you take to ensure coordination between the FAA and NORAD?

(6) **Decisions from the PEOC:** What were the key decisions that were made from the PEOC on the morning of 9/11? Who was making these decisions, and how were they being conveyed to the relevant agencies?

(7) **Details of Shoot Down Order:** With respect to the order authorizing the shoot down of commercial aircraft, last May you described a scene in which a young man came in and informed the Vice President that a plane was 50 miles out, then 30 miles out, then 10. He then asked "Do the orders still stand?" And the Vice President turned around and said of course the orders still stand, have you heard anything to the contrary?

a. Your testimony was that at the time you did not know what this was about, because you were not there when the Vice President first issued the shoot down order, is that correct?

b. Approximately how long after you entered the PEOC did this conversation that you described take place?

c. Do you know in relation to which aircraft – or rather which report of an inbound aircraft – this conversation took place? That is, do you know that the conversation you described relates to Flight 77, which hit the Pentagon?

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d. After this first scene that you described last May, did you later hear the Vice President or others reiterate the authorization to shoot down aircraft?

e. What did you know about the fighter planes that were being scrambled in response to the hijackings? Specifically, what do you remember (if anything) about planes being scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base?

(8) **Order to ground civilian aircraft:** Did you make this decision from the PEOC or before you arrived in the PEOC?

(9) **Flight 93:** In May, in response to a question from Mr. Hamilton regarding information about Flight 93, you stated that "the only information we had at that point was when it crashed."

- a. Who is the "we" in this statement?
- b. To your knowledge, did anyone in the PEOC have any knowledge or awareness of a hijacked plane headed to DC from Pennsylvania (which we now know was Flight 93)?
- c. Just to clarify your earlier testimony, to your knowledge there was no order from the PEOC to shoot down the inbound aircraft, that we now know was Flight 93?

MISCELLANEOUS

(1) After Action Review of Emergency Response on 9/11 – was one conducted and if not, why not?

(2) To your knowledge, were any specific employees at DOT or FAA either commended or in any way disciplined in connection with the events of 9/11?

(3) Knowledge of FAA decision pre 9-11 to decommission primary radar systems? Knowledge of that issue after 9-11?

(4) In terms of air traffic control, what changes (if any) were made after 9-11?